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The convention which met in 1787 to draft a federal con-
stitution never seriously questioned the wisdom of providing
for an executive veto and this in spite of the fact that only four
of the states had at that time any such provision in their con-
stitutions. Only two members, Franklin and Gorham seemed
to have spoken against any veto power whatever, while a few,
Wilson, Reed, Hamilton and Gouveneur Morris argued for an
absolute veto power. The real difference of opinion, however,
was between those who favored a qualified veto power in the
President alone and those who favored joining with the Presi-
dent a suitable number of the judiciary in the exercise of this
power: Realizing that a veto power would be given, Wilson
and Madison, probably the two ablest members of the conven-
tion, led the fight for the joining of the judiciary and the execu-
tive. Not satisfied with the indecisive vote of four states to
three against their proposal, they brought the matter up again
and again, and even after the matter had seemingly been settled
for good, late in the proceedings of the convention Madison
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proposed that all laws of Congress should be submitted to the
President and the Supreme Court separately. If both disap-
proved, a three fourths of both Houses would be necessary to
overide the veto; if one only disapproved a two-thirds vote
would be sufficient. The convention having decisively defeated
this proposal by a vote of eight states to three, the question was
not raised again.
It was in the debate on this question that we catch a glimpse
of what was probably the half formed opinion of most of the
members in respect to the power of the courts to declare laws
unconstitutional. Said Elbridge Gerry, as a reason for opposing
the joining of the judiciary and executive in the veto power,
"They (the courts) have a sufficient check.., by their exposi-
tion of the laws which involved a power of deciding upon their
constitutionality. In some states the judges had actually set
aside laws as being against their constitution. This was done
too with general approbation."
The explanation of the difference in the attitude of the
states as reflected in their constitutions and the federal consti-
tutional convention in respect to the veto power is found in the
character of this federal body. The attitude of mind back of
the Declaration of Independence was not the attitude of mind
back of the framing of the federal constitution. Many of the
men who, like Jefferson, Sam Adams, and Patrick Henry, were
passionate in their desire for individual liberty and jealous and
suspicious of governmental power were present neither in body
nor spirit in the constitutional convention. That body was a
body representing the conservative elements of the country,
feeling deeply the need of a strong national government and
concerned not so much with preserving the rights of the states
as with creating a national government of real power. The
sentiment of the convention as a whole was probably expressed
by Gerry when he said, "The evils we experience flow from the
excesses of democracy," and though Gouverneur Morris was
more a hater of democracy than most of the members, he prob-
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ably expressed a very general opinion when, in discussing the
veto power, he said, "It has been said that the Legislature
ought to be relied upon as the proper guardians of liberty. The
answer was short and conclusive. Either bad laws will be
passed or not. On the latter supposition no checks will be
wanted. On the former a strong check will be necessary and
that is the proper supposition. Emissions of paper money,
largesses to the people, a remission of debts and similar mea-
sures will at some time be popular and will be pushed for that
reason?."
It is not surprising, therefore, that the convention, admiring
as it did the British constitution, should have followed the
example of the British veto by incorporating the same power
in a modified form in the proposed constitution. "It is tolerably
clear," says Sir Henry Maine, "that the mental operation
through which the framers of the American constitution went
was this: 'They took the King of Great Britain, went through
his powers and restrained them whenever they seemed to be
excessive or unsuited to the circumstances of the United States.
... It was no anticipation of Queen Victoria but George III
himself whom they took for their model.'"
The experience of Ohio in respect to the veto power was
altogether different. The people of this western territory
were intensely partisan followers of the new Republican party
under the leadership of Thomas Jefferson. They did not share
the admiration of the "framers" of 1787 for the British consti-
tution, nor were they impressed with the example in the federal
constitution of a monarchial veto power. The opposition to the
veto power was intensified by the long standing and bitter con-
troversy with the Territorial Governor, General Arthur St.
Clair, who possessed under the Ordinance of 1787 the absolute
veto power. A remonstrance in the second Territorial Legisla-
ture at Chillicothe over the manner of his exercise of this abso-
lute veto power was presented to him on behalf of both Houses
and a similar remonstrance was sent to Congress. They re-
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quested him to return to them, before adjournment, bills he
felt he could not approve so that they possibly might amend
them in a way to meet his objections, but he refused, saying,
"I am sorry to tell you that it is altogether out of my power to
comply with it. The Ordinance of the government has placed
in the Governor an absolute negative on the bills of both Houses
and your request is that it may by me become vested into a kind
of qualified veto. You do not indeed require that should the
objections be thought of little weight your acts may become
laws without the Governor's assent. That would have been too
directly in the face of the Ordinance, though without it I must
own I cannot see any use in sending the objections to you."
The controversy became so bitter that at one time a mob of very
respectable citizens in Chillicothe broke into the house where
Governor St. Clair and some of his friends boarded and were
only stopped from a physical assault upon the Governor by
drawn pistols and the intercession of Thomas Worthington.
It was in this "climate of opinion" that the convention met
in 18oi to draft a constitution for the newly created state of
Ohio. It is not surprising that in the sketchy Journal of this
convention one finds no proposal or even suggestion for an
executive veto power. This short constitution was probably
copied in large part from the constitution of Tennessee drafted
a few years before which constitution contained no reference to
a veto power. It was later claimed by Governor Hoadley that
since this constitution was never submitted to the people for
ratification, but put into effect by the convention itself, it did
not represent the true feeling of the people on the question of
the veto power, being just a "fortuitious happening," but there
certainly is no evidence that the people's representatives did
not in this matter truly represent the people's will.
This is evidenced by the fact that when the second constitu-
tional convention met in 1 85i opinion had not greatly changed.
It is true that by this time the example of the federal constitu-
tion had found a place in a number of state constitutions. "We
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find," said a member of the convention, "that all the new con-
stitutions made within the last few years, the progressive consti-
tutions as they were called, those embodying the spirit of the
day... contained a two-thirds vote." The feeling against the
veto was however still so strong that the convention voted down
by a decisive vote a very modest proposal for a governor's veto
which could be overridden by a legislative vote of a majority
of the elected members. The sentiment of this convention was
probably expressed by Judge Rufus Ranney when, as a dele-
gate, he said, "I conclude by declaring that I shall vote against
all vetoes, everywhere, in all forms, and upon all occasions."
It is interesting to note that this great lawyer at this early date
favored a referendum to the voters of all that he called impor-
tant legislation. He was opposed, he said, "to giving to the
legislature power to enact all laws until they had been submitted
to a direct vote of the people."
The argument used in this convention by those who favored
a modest executive veto was not only the need of a check upon
hasty and ill advised legislation, but as well the need of giving
to the office of Governor greater prestige. Thomas Corwin,
when governor, said that so far as he could discover the only
prerogatives of the governor of Ohio were to grant pardons
and commission notaries public. The position of the governor
in the popular mind at that time is seen in a statement of a
delegate in the convention. "Now, sir, within my recollection,
if you were to go around and inquire who was the governor of
Ohio where there were twenty men present, they would look
at each other in perfect surprise and perhaps not a person pres-
ent would be able to tell you .... On the other hand, if you
should go into the state of Pennsylvania... if you were to meet
Ettle boys and girls and ask them who was the governor of
Pennsylvania, they would answer you just as readily as they
would give the name of their teacher because of this thing, the
veto power, in the hand of the executive."
In the convention of 1874 there was a strong sentiment for
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an executive veto. Though the statement of Governor Tom
Corwin was often quoted as showing the low estate into which
the office of governor had fallen, the real reasons for the exist-
ence of such power was, it was argued, found in the need of a
check upon unwise legislation. "For more than seventy years,"
said a delegate, "our laws have been enacted by a simple ma-
jority vote of each branch of the General Assembly and the
result has been that acts of questionable constitutionality and
doubtful expediency have been numbered among the statutes."
"Does not every lawyer know," said another delegate, "that
our libraries are filled with statute books and the great body of
them are filled with repealed statutes which have been enacted
through hasty legislation because there was no check upon the
General Assembly?"
The fight in this convention for a veto provision was led by
Samuel F. Hunt, whose youth was often referred to, and
George Hoadley, both from Hamilton County. The fight
against it was led by Wm. H. West, "the blind man eloquent,"
Joseph P. Carberry, and John B. Coats. The question of the
veto power took up a good deal of the time of the convention
and the debate upon it, due to the great ability of those who
participated, was of an unusually high order.
At this-time, out of the thirty-seven states in the Union,
thirty-two had in their constitutions a provision for some kind
of an executive veto, but ten of these, including several dose to
Ohio, required only a majority legislative vote to override the
veto.
The first proposal adopted in the convention of 1874 was
for a veto to be overridden by a two-thirds legislative vote.
This was later changed to a three-fifths vote and still later to a
majority vote of elected members. This last plan was one sub-
mitted by Campbell, a much respected member of the conven-
tion who had been for many years a member of Congress, as a
compromise plan and was thought to be the final decision of the
convention, but Hunt and Hoadley were determined to secure
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a stronger executive veto power and so the question was again
opened up for debate. The able arguments of these men were
so effective that the convention again made a decision, and this
time in favor of a three-fifths vote. The feeling by this time
had become quite bitter as is evidenced by the remarks of West
upon the motion of Hoadley to reconsider the vote just taken
in favor of a three-fifths vote so as to clinch the vote. "I regret
very much," said West, "that this matter has reached the crises
where it has. I really did hope in framing a constitution here
that I could give it my cordial support. I supposed the matter
settled by the compromise we made the other day.... I simply
desire to state to the convention - but it is not in temper now,
I see, to listen to anything or hear anybody. We have nothing
more to do, I suppose, but to record the edict of the veteran
autocrat of the Commercial and the young princes of the En-
quirer, issued forth this morning. It is introducing into the
constitution a new feature that our people are not accustomed
to and because of which, together with other features, will array
against it such opposition as to secure its defeat." "If I have no
other legacy or inheritance," said Coats, a bitter opponent of any
veto power, "to transmit to posterity in general, or to those who
sustain a nearer and dearer relationship who shall survive me or
come after me bearing my humble name, I desire to leave to
such what I conceive to be the honorable record of my action
here in opposition to this proposition .... It is an insult to the
people to give out to them for their approval an instrument
emanating from this body with this objectionable feature in-
corporated therein."
The prophecy of these men as to the reception the work of
the convention would receive at the hands of the people was
fulfilled, for the constitution was rejected by them in toto as
well as the separate proposals submitted. How far this rejec-
tion was due to the inclusion of the veto provision it is hard to
say, for there were other provisions which proved to be equally
if not more unpopular. That it had its part is seen in the state-
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ment of the Cincinnati Commercial, which favored ratification
on the eve of the election. Said this paper, "The principles of
minority representation and veto have provoked the greatest
discussion and dissension on the articles in the constitution and
will probably be the main questions in its ratification." Camp-
bell strongly opposed ratification and did so no doubt in part
because of the defeat in the convention of his veto plan.
After the vote, however, the newspapers seemed to think
that other sources of dissatisfaction were the main causes of its
rejection. The length of the convention, lasting as it did for
almost a year, wearied the people so that, according to the
Ohio State Journal, "There were probably not a thousand men
in Ohio who had read the constitution through when they came
to vote upon it." The fact, that, of the one hundred and four
members, sixty-four were lawyers, and that the entire bar, be-
cause of the section on the Judiciary, were a unit for it, made
the people suspicious of it. The including, among the separate
matters submitted, of a proposal for the licensing of liquor, led
the temperance forces to vote en masse against it, and the rejec-
tion by the conventi6n with but one vote in its favor, of a reso-
lution permitting the legislature to appropriate school funds to
denominational schools, with an attendant bitter debate, created
strong Catholic opposition. "The constitution," said the Cin-
cinnati Commercial, "encountered more opposition among
Catholics because of the failure to make provision for a division
of the school fund than -we had anticipated. The advice of the
Catholic Telegram to vote against it as a protest against a wrong
principle was widely adopted."
The combination of these forces, together with the opposi-
tion created by the minority representation and veto provision
led, as said above, to the constitution being overwhelmingly
defeated at the special election provided for by the convention.
Though it was to a degree a party issue, strong Republican
counties ruled against it. The Cincinnati Enquirer on the day
before the election urged the people to vote against it. Strange
HISTORY OF THE EXECUTIVE VETO 107
to say, the only thing in the Constitution it favored was the
veto provision and that, it thought, ought to have required a
two-thirds instead of a three-fifths vote of the legislature for
repassage.
In the fall of 1903 Ohio, which had by now gotten along
without any veto power for over a century, suddenly gave to
its governor the most drastic veto power ever given an execu-
tive in this country, for the amendment adopted in that year
provided that the governor should have the power to veto any
item in any bill, and that for the legislature to override the veto
of an item or the entire bill, the vote must be at least two-thirds
of each house, with the additional strange provision that the
vote must be not less than that which the bill received in its
original passage. As a result, regardless of the size of the vote
which passed the bill originally even though it were unanimous,
a single vote less on repassage would prevent its becoming a law.
It was said in the convention of i912, in debate, "That veto
was given to us by the use of the Longworth Law which we all
understand was an infamous law and the people who voted to
give the governor a veto power did not find out-a great many
of them-that they had voted to give that power, until some-
time afterward." "Is it not a fact," said another delegate,
"that this malodorous veto power originated in the brain of
Marcus Aurelius Hanna."
There is no doubt but that the Longworth law was in large
measure responsible for the adoption of this drastic amendment.
The constitution of i851 provided that an amendment to be
ratified must receive not only a majority of all the votes cast
on the amendment, but as well a majority of all the votes cast
for the general officers at that election. The result was, due to
the indifference of the people to such trifling matters as consti-
tutional amendments and their consequent refusal to vote for
or against a proposed amendment, that it was practically im-
possible ever to secure the ratification of an amendment even
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though those voting on the question itself were vastly in the
majority.
This inability to secure any change in the fundamental law
became displeasing to the leaders of the Republican party which
was then the dominant political party in the state. Certain
things they wanted done could only be done by constitutional
change and so an ingenius plan called the Longworth law was
devised. This law, named after its author or at least its spon-
sor, Nicholas Longworth, who was then (i902) a member of
the General Assembly, provided in effect that if a political
party in its state convention voted in favor of a proposed amend-
ment it should be put on the ballot in the party column and a
straight vote for the party ticket would count as a vote for the
amendment. After this all a proposed amendment needed to
insure its adoption was its approval by a dominant political
party, for receiving it, the same indifference of the voters which
before made ratification well nigh impossible now made adop-
tion equally certain.
This law did not last long, but while it lasted and particu-
larly for a short time after its passage, it was used by the
Republican party to secure the adoption of several desired
amendments. Three such amendments were approved by this
party in the fall of 19o2 and, being put in its party column,
were of course triumphantly adopted. One of these amend-
ments was the veto amendment discussed above. It would
seem, however, unfair to lay all the blame, if blame it be, on
the Republican party and Marcus Hanna for the adoption of
the amendment, for according to the newspapers of that date,
Mayor Thomas L. Johnson of Cleveland, the Democratic can-
didate for Governor, also favored its ratification.
That this veto amendment was not popular is seen in the
fact that only three years after its adoption the General Assem-
bly by a vote lacking only one of being unanimous, submitted to
the people an amendment greatly modifying its drastic pro-
visions, but this proposal, lacking the aid of the Longworth law
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and the approval of a dominant political party, failed of adop-
tion though it carried every county and received a vote of five
to one in its favor of those voting upon it.
It is not surprising therefore that soon after the convening
of the liberal constitutional convention of 1912 a resolution
was introduced providing for a greatly limited executive veto
power. Without much debate and without a single alteration
the resolution was approved by the convention and upon rati-
fication by the people became, in 1912, section 16 of Article II
of our present constitution which in its main provisions reads
as follows:
"Every bill passed by the General Assembly shall before it
becomes a law be presented to the governor for his approval.
... If he does not approve it he shall return it with his objec-
tions in writing to the house in which it originated.., which
may then reconsider the vote in its passage. If three-fifths of
the members elected to this house vote to repass it it shall be
sent to the other house. . . . If three-fifths of the members
elected to that house vote to repass it it shall become a law...
unless the general assembly by adjournment prevents its return
in which case it shall become a law unless within ten days after
such adjournment it shall be filed by him with his objections
in writing in the office of the Secretary of State. The governor
may disapprove any item or items in any bill making an appro-
priation of money and the item or items so disapproved shall
be void unless repassed in the manner prescribed for the repass-
age of a bill."
It is apparent that this amendment was taken from the
amendment submitted by the constitutional convention of 1874,
for they are almost identical in form and substance. It differs
radically from the amendment of 1903 in that it reduces the
legislative vote required for repassage from two-thirds to three-
fifths, does away with the strange provision about requiring as
many votes in repassage as received on original passage, and
limits the item veto to appropriating money.
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The debate on the question of a veto power did not take up
anything like as much time, nor was it of such high quality, in
the convention of 1912, as was the debate on the same question
in the convention of 1874. This same comparison can be made
of the entire debate in these two conventions, for the convention
of 1874, called the lawyers' convention and for that reason
probably unpopular, was a body of unusually able men, while
the convention of 1912, chosen during the progressive move-
ment of that day, was a body of men all sincere and some very
able, but not distinguished as a group.
There was considerable sentiment in this convention against
the veto power. This expressed itself in a resolution to do away
with it entirely which was laid upon the table by a vote of sixty-
nine to thirty-one, and a resolution to require only a majority
legislative vote to repass a bill after a veto, which resolution
was likewise laid upon the table by a narrow margin of seven
votes.
The provision, however, which seemed to bother the con-
vention most was the one concerning the power of the governor
to veto bills after the adjournment of the legislature. This, it
was claimed, in effect gave the governor the power of absolute
veto upon many important bills. This arose from the practice
of the general assembly of postponing the passage of many bills,
including usually the general appropriation bill, until the day
of adjournment. "I have stood," said a delegate (Mr. Doty)
who had been clerk of the lower house, "at that desk and called
sixty-six rolls on sixty-six laws in a single day. These laws go
to the governor all at once and then we go home and he can
veto every one of them and we can't do a thing." The Mary-
land Supreme Court (129 Md. 523) cites an instance in that
state of five hundred bills being presented to the governor at
one time upon adjournment. The convention recognized the
possibility of such a power being left in the hands of the gover-
nor, but seemed to think the solution was easy in that all the
legislature need to do was to stay in session ten days after all
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bills were passed, signed, engraved, and presented to the gover-
nor, so that they could, if they wished, repass the bills over his
veto. The answer from experience made to this was that while
this was possible it was not in practice feasible, for the legisla-
ture is not willing to stay around or even return after a recess
after all the work is done, even to check the governor's veto
power.
There is an inconsistency in a democracy giving to the gov-
ernor in practice such an absolute power over legislative acts,
particularly in Ohio where, under the referendum, we have the
power to correct ill advised or corrupt legislation. Every state
has recognized this and yet no state has found a satisfactory
way of preventing it. Various methods have been tried.
I. By providing as did the constitution of Ohio prior to the
adoption of the present veto section, that in case the governor
vetoed a bill after adjournment the Secretary of State "shall
return such bill together with such objections upon the opening
of the next following session of the general assembly. .. where
it shall be treated in like manner as if returned within the pre-
scribed time." This would seem to be a fairly good provision.
The States of Florida, Maine, and Mississippi still retain such
a provision in their constitutions. In practice, however, it is
wholly ineffective. The following session is often two years
after the former session has adjourned; it is a body of almost all
new members totally unfamiliar with what went on in the pre-
vious session; the house in which the bill originated no longer
exists at least in its constituent membership. It is a simpler
procedure if the new legislature wants a similar bill passed to
pass it as a new measure for this requires not a three-fifths but
only a majority vote. At least this is the way the convention
of 1914 felt about it, for, when it was suggested that this pro-
vision be retained in the constitution of Ohio, the member who
had proposed and was in charge of the veto resolution said, "I
believe it is one of the most pernicious things in the whole
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matter," and the convention by common consent seemed to have
dropped the suggestion from further consideration.
2. By providing, as does the constitution of the United
States and many states which in their constitution have adopted
the language used there, that "if any bill shall not be returned
by the President (Governor) within ten days after it shall have
been presented to him the same shall be a law in like manner
as if he had signed it unless the Congress (Legislature) by their
adjournment prevents its return, in which case it shall not be
a law."
This would seem in first reading to be dear. It shall not be
a law. That means that the bill is dead and the governor has
no power either of veto or approval. The Georgia Supreme
Court declared (Soloman vs. Commrs. of Cartersville, 41 Ga.
157) that if the question were de novo they would so hold but
that a long continued practice to the contrary led them to an
opposite holding, and the Kansas Supreme Court (State ex rel
vs. Ryan, 123 Kansas 767) held that under such a provision the
effect of adjournment was to prevent the bill from becoming a
law. Other states having a like provision have held differently,
seeming to feel that there was no intent by such a provision to
take from the governor his power of veto after a reasonable
time for consideration.
The like provision in the federal constitution never received
an authoritative interpretation until the decision in Edwards vs,
U. S. (286 U.S. 482, 52 S. Ct. 627, 76 L. Ed. 1239) in 1932,
though its meaning had been much discussed for over a century.
Monroe raised the question in a cabinet meeting, and the cabinet
dividing, refused to sign a bill after the adjournment of Con-
gress. Hoover and Wilson upon the advice of their Attorney
Generals did sign one or two bills under like circumstances. The
general practice, however, of the presidents had been to sign all
bills during the legislative session "induced by a purpose to
avoid rather than decide the question." As the Supreme Court
said in the Edwards case, "The general practice of presidents
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in being present at the Capital for the purpose of signing bills
during the closing hours indicated the existence of doubt and
the desire to avoid controversy." In that case the Supreme
Court definitely settled the matter by deciding that the Presi-
dent, in spite of this provision, had the power to save bills by
signing them after the adjournment of Congress. "The pro-
vision," said the court, "that a bill shall not become a law if
its return has been prevented by adjournment of Congress is
apposite to bills that are not signed, not to those that are
signed."
With this interpretation fairly well settled, provisions of
this kind whether in federal or state constitutions fail to limit
in any way the absolute power of life or death of the chief ex-
ecutive over the many bills presented to him at or after final
adjournment.
3. This leaves but one other way to prevent the exercise
of this absolute power of veto by the governor and that is for
the legislature to remain in session or to return from recess ten
days (in Ohio) after all bills are passed, signed by the presiding
officers, engraved and presented to the Governor. This was
the way suggested in the convention of 1912. When it was
pointed out that a very good governor had vetoed a very good
bill after final adjournment, the proposer of the present veto
provision said, "Can you imagine a legislature in Ohio so stupid
that they would give the governor of this state another such
opportunity? I cannot." And yet we find in 1935 the General
Assembly and the Governor at logger heads because of the
Governor's veto absolute in effect on bills left in his hands after
previous final adjournment. Again we hear it said that the
General Assembly will never adjourn again but only recess
until the ten days is over, but the chances are that again and
again the General Assembly in its eagerness to get home for
good after all the work is done will finally adjourn leaving
many bills in the Governor's hands. Jn fact, there is ground for
the suspicion that many times the General Assembly adjourns
114 LAW JOURNAL - MARCH, 1936
gladly, leaving in the hands of the Governor the power of
absolute veto with the secret hope that he will exercise it.
This has been merely a cursory review of the development
of the veto power through the Ohio constitutions. The lan-
guage in the present constitution seems simple and the meaning
clear, but such is the difficulty in using language to convey ideas
that almost every sentence is capable of different interpretations.
At what time is a bill "presented to the governor" so as to start
the running of the ten days period prescribed for its return?
What constitutes an "item" in an appropriation bill? Does
"after adjournment" mean only final or does it include tem-
porary adjournments? What is the meaning of the provision
"unless the general assembly by adjournment prevents its re-
turn in which case it shall become a law unless within ten days
after such adjournment it shall be filed by him with his objec-
tions in writing in the office of the Secretary of State," in respect
to a case like the recent veto of the Governor of items in the
appropriation bill, which veto was filed in the office of the Sec-
retary of State many days after the ten days after adjournment
had taken place but not longer than ten days after it had been
"presented" to him? These questions and particularly the last
two named and their effect upon the validity of the recent
appropriation bill vetoes by the Governor, will be discussed in
a subsequent article.
